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ABSTRACT: It is often assumed that science provides the most accurate knowledge about 
nature. This view not only collapses distinctions between different forms of knowing but also 
results in a paradox whereby understanding what it means to exist in the world is dictated by 
practitioners of science. In this essay I argue for the relevance of an existential conception of 
nature via the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and how his notions of thrownness and phusis 
enable us to recognize a certain ethical bond to nature. I conclude with a critical analysis of 
liability insurance and actuarial science to demonstrate my points. 
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There is an inherent tension, if not paradox, in how we conceive nature as something 
accessible by virtue of its being ‘natural,’ and thus in conformity with our given senses, 
while believing at the same time that ever improving methods of analysis in the 
sciences provide more accurate knowledge of nature not accessible by means of the 
unaided human senses. Alasdair MacIntyre notes this tension in terms of the turn in 
Western history when empiricism and the natural sciences begin to part ways, when 
we no longer place much trust in what appears to us and seek instead the underlying 
causes of appearances invisible to the human eye.2 It is true that assumptions as to 
what scientific theory is describing in actuality have been hotly debated by 
philosophers of science;3 however, our everyday existence is, despite these debates, 
1 My thanks to James Williams for reading and commenting on a version of this article as well as to Brian 
Smith for discussing with me debates on structural realism. 
2 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Second Edition, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, p. 
80; cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1945, p. 12. 
3 See, for example, debates on structural realism in Structural Realism, Peter Bokulich and Alisa Bokulich 
(eds.), Dordrecht, Springer, 2011. 
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largely dominated by the belief that what science tells us must be true and accurate. 
This historical and methodological tension serves well to set the context in which I 
want to appeal to the relevance of an existential understanding of nature since there is 
something uncanny, to use Martin Heidegger’s term [unheimlich],4 about a historical 
situation in which the most accurate form of knowledge is often thought to consist of 
the reports made by practitioners of the natural sciences. What is particularly uncanny 
is how we distrust knowledge accessible to us by virtue of simply existing as embodied 
beings in a life-world, that is, a world commonly and directly experienced. To use an 
almost cliché but nonetheless relevant example, one can say we believe in the 
astronomically represented universe in which the earth revolves around the sun. Yet, 
the modern astronomical representation of the earth and sun is not the same 
representation by which we live when orienting ourselves to horizons, cycles of the 
day, and especially the symbolic meanings of the sun and its light and warmth which 
we employ to give meaning to occasions.5 
But a strong proponent of the scientific worldview may discount the credibility of 
so called existentialist complaints, either claiming that we should strive to live 
according to current scientific findings or simply disregard as trivial how we act in 
ways often contrary to these findings. Neither claim is satisfactory, not only because 
both involve a latent evaluative (and even ethical) position about the status of scientific 
discoveries and their relation to how we should live, but also because whatever science 
discovers is, in the last analysis, not accessible by its non-practioners. The 
argumentative force of existentialism can be seen as questioning the status and role of 
this expert type of knowledge and how human beings qua human beings require 
another form of knowing and relating that is experienceable directly—or what is often 
captured by the distinction between scientific knowledge and existential understanding.6 
On this view, an understanding of nature and how we might exist in relation to it does 
not require science. This is not to say that it is a rival to scientific knowledge but that it 
precisely fulfils a different role in the actualising of an embodied and lived existence. 
Having said this, there is no unified concept of nature for those philosophers often 
placed under the label ‘existentialism.’ In fact, basics texts on existentialism often begin 
by noting the historical inaccuracy of the term. The only philosopher ever claiming to 
be existentialist was Jean-Paul Sartre, and he later recanted the title. Nonetheless, 
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany, SUNY, 1996, p. 176/188. In keeping 
with convention, when referring to Being and Time, the pagination from the 7th edition of the German text 
will be given in italics. 
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 96/103. 
6 Paul Ricoeur, ‘The task of hermeneutics,’ in John B. Thompson (ed.), Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 
trans. John B. Thompson, Cambridge: Cambridge University, p. 53–54. 
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what I take to be consistent with many of the philosophers thought to be existentialist 
is the insistence that our general understanding is misguided and staked on illusion in 
some respect. Consider Albert Camus when he says we must encounter the absurdity 
of our existence as we might enter a desert. There it finds ‘its bread,’ realizing that ‘it 
had previously been feeding on phantoms.’7 Karl Jaspers regards as highly problematic 
our tendency to want to describe things as objects. He refers to so-called objective 
knowledge as a limited form of relation that cannot encompass the whole of being and 
reality: ‘Reality is therefore what resists all thought.’8 When Sartre famously states that 
‘we are condemned to be free,’ he does so on the basis of conceiving our perceptions of 
the past as a form of limitation which can result in an existence predicated on bad 
faith. What is possible remains open, and so in this sense, one cannot even speak of a 
future since it defines what is to be expected or what is to come.9 It should not be 
forgotten that, in addition, existentialism often views science and technology as 
exacerbating our condition of misunderstanding; they incapacitate our ability to return 
to a basic reflection on our own existence and how we relate to things in this existence 
in our efforts and desire to be. This criticism of science and technology10 has primarily 
to do with the manner in which it shapes our forms of understanding and relation by 
insisting on what is really real. Gabriel Marcel calls this intrusion the reduction of 
existence to function, in which the highest value is usefulness. ‘Life in a world centered 
on function,’ he concludes, ‘is liable to despair because in reality this world is empty.’11 
A life reduced to usefulness means deciding what constitutes use and what therefore, 
by virtue of not having this quality, should be discarded or ignored. One effect, as 
Marcel notes, is how elderly people, no longer conceived to be of economic usefulness 
to a society, are neglected by ‘some appalling mistake.’12 
Given this suspicion of science, what may be termed an existential understanding 
of nature would involve bracketing out expressly scientific representations of natural 
life which might influence our relation to nature, or what is the way in which scientific 
definitions of nature come to be represented in the non-scientifically concerned 
7 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus & Other Essays, trans. Justin O’Brien, New York, Vintage, 1955, pp. 
16–17. 
8 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy of Existence, trans. Richard F. Grabau, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 
1954, p. 69. 
9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London, Routledge, 1958, pp. 128–29. 
10 Or what is ‘technoscience’; see Robert C. Scharff, ‘Displacing Epistemology: Being in the Midst of 
Technoscientific Practice,’ Foundations of Science, vol. 16, no. 2, 2011, pp. 227–43. 
11 Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, trans. Manya Harari, Secaucus, The Citadel, 1956, p. 12. 
12 Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, p. 12. 
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cultural imaginary. Popular notions of social Darwinism, for example, not only draw 
on a distortion of Darwin’s theory of evolution but also talk as if we (i.e. everyday 
people) can readily observe evolution at work.13 So if the critical orientation of 
existentialism can be expressed as a suspicion of the relevance of scientific knowledge 
for grasping the relation between human existence and nature, its constructive bearing 
involves not only proposing an alternative but also offering a conception of nature 
readily accessible to us as existentially embodied beings. Beyond this suspicion, I want 
to add a more specific thesis that is arguably existential insofar as it is Heideggerian: 
Nature is not merely resource but source. The former is generally consistent with a 
scientific understanding even where science supports notions of environmental 
conservation. A forest, even conserved, is still a resource.14 The latter (nature as source) 
is what I will attempt to show derives from an existential relation and has meaningful 
existential implications. I will draw on two facets of Heidegger’s philosophy in 
attempting to persuade the reader how our relation to nature can best be described as 
a form of existential bond. 
In the first half of this essay, I examine what I argue to be a key feature of the 
scientific worldview that informs the cultural imaginary—i.e. R. G. Collingwood’s 
notion of the reduction of substance to function. I then employ Heidegger’s concepts 
of thrownness and phusis (nature) to show how nature is not resource but source, and as 
such, how it gives rise to a type of existential bond, which can be understood broadly 
as an ethical relation. I conclude by briefly examining liability insurance and how it 
distorts our relation to nature when attempting to account for contingency through the 
use of actuarial science. 
THE REDUCTION OF SUBSTANCE TO FUNCTION 
Collingwood’s influential The Idea of Nature (1945) begins by distinguishing three major 
historical shifts in the conception of nature which are driven by philosophical 
distinctions in the first periods (i.e. ancient Greek and Renaissance) and then by mostly 
scientific ones in the last period (i.e. modernity). While it might be easy to dismiss his 
assessment of the modern conception of nature as outdated by virtue of the changes 
13 Mary Midgley, Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom and Morality, London, Routledge, 1994, and Stephen Jay 
Gould, ‘Darwinian Fundamentalism,’ The New York Review of Books, June 12, 1997, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/jun/12/darwinian-fundamentalism/?pagination=false. 
14 Cf. Bruce Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature, Amherst, 
Humanity Books, 1995, p. 9. 
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that have taken place within the scientific communities since 1945,15 to do so would be 
a mistake in at least two respects. First, his historical delineations are deliberately 
ambiguous, not for lack of scrutiny, but for his emphasis on what he views to be 
significant conceptual shifts determining how we interpret our relation to reality, or 
what he calls cosmology.16 Indeed, Collingwood understands the priority of concepts 
as producing a strain in which these concepts are never settled or at rest but 
dynamically moving history.17 These conceptual shifts do not square easily with typical 
historical demarcations of periods, which may not necessarily see conceptions of 
nature as constituting the uniqueness of an era. So even if historical demarcations 
complement Collingwood’s analysis, he will have different reasons for noting 
distinctions between periods. For example, he argues that one significant difference 
articulating a cosmological shift is how the Greeks saw nature as intelligent whereas 
Renaissance thinkers saw this intelligence as being owed to something other than 
nature, that is, as super-natural.18 Second, as I intend to argue shortly, Collingwood’s 
description of the modern scientific conception of nature as one of ‘substance resolved 
into function’ is still accurate.19 Demonstrating the second point will go a long way in 
vindicating the first, and this is because it will mean that Collingwood’s intention to 
understand history as conceptually driven cannot be dismissed for the specificity of its 
historical authorship. We exist still in an era dominated by function.  
So what, then, does Collingwood mean when he says the modern conception of 
nature involves a vocabulary ‘such that all words and phrases descriptive of substance 
or structure shall be replaced by words and phrases descriptive of function’ and ‘[t]he 
tendency of all modern science of nature is to resolve substance into function’?20 He 
does not simply mean that nature is viewed as a mechanism. In fact, he sees the 
mechanistic representation to be typical of the Cartesian pre-modern era (in 
Collingwood’s delineation of periods). Furthermore, mechanism is inconsistent with 
15 Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, Chicago, University of Chicago, 2005, pp. 8, 142 and 
A. W. Moore, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University, 2012, pp. 493–511. Moore’s criticism of Collingwood relates here only indirectly. He charges 
Collingwood’s conception of metaphysics with being conservative, descriptive and unable to initiate 
historical change through analysis.  
16 Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, p. 4. 
17 Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Revised Edition, Oxford, Clarendon, 1940, p. 74. 
18 Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, p. 5. On its medieval antecedents, see Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: 
An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture, New Haven, Yale University, pp. 174–81. 
19 Dupré, Passage to Modernity, p. 10. Cf. the role of function in current debates in philosophy of science; 
Steve French and James Ladyman, ‘In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism,’ in Peter Bokulich and Alisa 
Bokulich (eds.), Structural Realism, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, pp. 25–42. 
20 Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, pp. 22–23 and 16, respectively. 
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the modern view. This distinction cannot be overlooked. While the structure of any 
given machine involves its various parts, its operation requires the overall unity of 
these parts working together in rhythm. These parts, nonetheless, are independent of 
the machine; and it is this independence that separates substance from function. 
Let us see this argument in more detail. Collingwood takes the substance of parts 
to be their structural properties—e.g. ‘size, shape, weight, hardness, and so forth.’21 In 
contradistinction to the traditional notion of substance as a hidden substrate, substance 
can here be understood in a general Aristotelian sense as the beingness (ousia) of the 
part, that is, what makes the part appropriate for its respective machine. Hence 
Collingwood states that ‘[u]nless the piece of steel has the right shape, hardness, &c., it 
will not serve [for example] as a bearing.’22 The structural properties of a bearing are 
in fact those things which, when taken together, constitute this bearing appropriate for 
its respective machine. Seen in this way, the substance of the part is independent of the 
machine; and even more to the point, we find upon closer consideration that the 
machine presupposes the substance of its parts precisely because the machine cannot 
function without the specific structural properties of the parts. A bicycle cassette 
cannot function without the bearings; a hard drive is not a hard drive without its 
circular cobalt alloyed platter. Thus, we can make a distinction between the properties 
associated with a machinic function and the properties associated with the structure of 
the parts. Collingwood concludes, ‘structural properties belonging to a given part of a 
given machine [. . .] are the foundation and pre-requisite of its functional properties.’23 
One need only consider so-called simple machines in which the composition of a 
screw, for example, contains a range of possible and distinct functions—e.g. for driving 
into wood, metal, or mortar. 
There is one more point to note relating to the meaning of nature. Conceived as a 
machine, nature is not self-moving but moved from without, just as a person might 
wind a clock or switch on the power. And consistent with the points above, its 
functioning presupposes the independent structural reality of the parts. As moved from 
without, this means effectively that as a mechanism, nature has no inherent meaning: 
Its activation lies outside it, and its functioning is possible only because of its 
constituent parts. Collingwood labels this conception loosely as Renaissance, and 
though he does not provide a definite historical range, it includes the likes of 
21Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, p. 16. 
22 Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, p. 16. 
23 Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, p. 16. 
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Copernicus (1473–1543), Bruno (1508–1588), Descartes (1596–1650), Kant (1724–1804), 
and Hegel (1770–1831).24 
In the instance of the modern conception, substance and function are conflated, 
not due to a category mistake but a shift in how nature is linked to an end innate to 
itself and no longer outside it. Collingwood notes this as the reintroduction of 
teleology. Whatever the case may be, the designation of an end or aim which nature 
obeys means in turn that its parts obey the same laws, as it were. In this respect, the 
parts are not really distinct since they have their meaning, or substance, only as they 
conform or contribute to the teleological process. Natural processes and the various 
parts involved are seen as moving towards or conforming to an end given in nature 
itself. In other words, natural processes are viewed with a telos, which in turn colors the 
vocabulary of descriptions of nature to the extent that these descriptions effectively 
omit any real distinction between substance (or structure) and parts. At one level, the 
claim is quite basic: Given the presence of a telos which orders a process toward itself, 
everything involved in the process is itself caused to obey this end. At another level, 
instead of referring explicitly to a final, causal end, the language of modern science 
notes this relation passively. Instead of a final cause determining the process, the parts 
of nature behave in a certain way as if intending towards this end. Collingwood observes 
that the structural property of the hardness of steel is, for example, ‘the name for a way 
in which it [steel] behaves . . . the name for a rapid movement of the particles 
composing it, whereby these violently bombard anything that is brought into contact 
with it.’25 
Collingwood also sees this reduction as drawing on a conception of history as 
progress in which natural incidents are defined by an end in view. Incidents are thus 
not merely incidental; they are events actualizing an end, or what is to come.26 On this 
historical conception, there is no pure instant in nature but instead a narrative of 
events defined in relation to the end of whatever narrative a scientific theory offers. A. 
N. Whitehead provides perhaps the most genial example of the emphasis on events 
when rejecting a simple linear representation of time in favor of the theory of 
relativity. On first glance, relativity might seem to indicate a non-resolvable field of 
complex time relations, of which Whitehead speaks in terms of co-presence and non-
co-presence. Yet despite this, he still envisions a ‘creative advance’ by which the bundle 
24 For all his talk of dialectic and the reconciliation of spirit and matter, Hegel’s view of nature was that it 
was cyclical but non-developmental. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopaedia 
of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford, Oxford University, 2004, p. 20, §249. 
25 Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, p. 17; my emphasis. 
26 Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, pp. 25–26. 
                                                          
 TODD MEI 145 
of time relations can be understood.27 Creativity has a telos inherent to the natural 
processes of time which allows us to make sense of complex time relations. Indeed, 
whatever configuration we opt for when discussing time relations, the events 
comprising the measurement of any particular configuration are not only essential to 
the identity of this configuration but also are not really singular by themselves. The 
historical element arises in how a human point of view makes sense of relativity in 
terms of an advance towards an end. Moreover, this advance tends to be represented 
in terms of a field because a field accounts for both a plurality of possibilities and an 
overall complex arrangement of those possibilities which affect the bodies within it. In 
other words, a field helps us to determine how a body will behave as if directed by 
something, some end.28 
INSTANCES OF THE REDUCTION: DAWKINS, DENNETT, AND BECKER 
In this section I want to discuss briefly three modern texts which substantiate 
Collingwood’s diagnosis and which bear a strong relation to how we represent 
ourselves and our relation to nature. These instances have been selected based upon 
their influence on our everyday understanding. In the cases of Richard Dawkins and 
Daniel Dennett, nature is represented as a loosely organized arena in which organisms 
vie for survival and which often motivates popular social applications of ‘survival of the 
fittest.’ In the case of Gary Becker, the field of human choice and action, or human 
nature, is described according to preference and maximum individual benefit which 
reinforces the liberal conception of the individual being prior in importance to society 
as well as the idea that the economy is an autonomous sphere having authority over 
other social relations. I should note here, however, that due to the limitations of this 
essay, I will not discuss the ways in which we can speak specifically of the influence of 
science translating into our everyday understanding. Instead I will assume the validity 
of this influence and comment only generally that many philosophers have discussed 
how scientific theory involves a kind of modelling which is imaginative and 
metaphorical. As such, and as its theories become dominant in the cultural imaginary, 
they tend to redescribe our relation to nature and to others. Edmund Husserl, for 
example, speaks of a general skepticism deriving from positivistic science which 
favours a certain mode of experience [Erfahrung] that excludes the specifically human.29 
27 A. N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1920, pp. 177–78; my 
emphasis. 
28 Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p. 181. Cf. Whitehead, Process and Reality, David Ray Griffin and 
Donald W. Sherburne (eds.), New York, The Free Press, 1978, pp. 34–36, 99–100. 
29 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr, 
Evanston, Northwestern University, 1970, pp. 13, 5–7. 
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Paul Ricoeur extends the figurative function of narrative to scientific models when 
observing their heuristic purpose for construing meaning in the world.30 This purpose 
is discussed in remarkable detail by Mary Morgan when speaking of the ‘artefactual’ 
functioning of scientific models which 
express accounts of life in an exact, short form, using languages that may easily 
abstract or analogise, and involve imaginative choices and even a certain degree 
of playfulness in expression, all within a structure that follows certain rules.31 
On these views, the scientific endeavor to explain life and its imaginative modelling 
combine to blur the lines between fact and evaluation, between scientific model and 
expressions of how to exist. 
Taking the first instances of Dawkins and Dennett, one finds a prevalence given to 
the telos of the survival of a species. But this is not all. In contrast to the theory of 
evolution proposed in Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), survival is 
designated as an over-arching goal determining the minutest of details. This 
determination is exactly what Collingwood envisages when speaking of substance 
resolving into function. We can try to make sense of the parts within nature or an 
organism, but if life is in a constant struggle of adapting to its surroundings, then these 
parts really have no independent substance apart from this struggle. They exist for 
survival. So when Dawkins speaks of ‘survival machines,’ he does not mean machine 
in Collingwood’s sense (i.e. Renaissance) since the parts of the machine are conceived 
as explainable only by the ability to survive. Thus, genes are selfish by virtue of being a 
biological part motivated by its survival, and Dawkins is being perfectly consistent 
when viewing the feeling of our own subjectivity as a development of these parts (i.e. 
genes): 
Colonies of genes they may be but, in their behaviour, bodies have undeniably 
acquired an individuality of their own. An animal moves as a coordinated whole, 
as a unit. Subjectively I feel like a unit, not a colony. This is to be expected. 
Selection has favoured genes that cooperate with others. In the fierce competition 
for scarce resources, in the relentless struggle to eat other survival machines, and 
to avoid being eaten, there must have been a premium on central coordination 
rather than anarchy within the communal body.32 
30 Paul Ricoeur, ‘The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality,’ in Mario J. Valdés (ed.), A Ricoeur Reader: 
Reflection and Imagination, New York, Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 135. 
31 Mary Morgan, The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University, 2012, p. 386. 
32 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford, Oxford University, 1989, pp. 46–47. 
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In effect, whatever distinctions we can observe of ourselves and other organisms, the 
parts that make biological wholes (survival machines), and more circumspectively the 
panorama of life itself, is reducible to the function of survival. That is to say, the 
particularity of any being is best understood as a function of its survival. 
While agreeing with the pre-eminence of survival, Daniel Dennett offers a slightly 
different case. One can say that survival is so entirely identical with nature that it does 
not even act as a purpose, but simply the state of affairs, or what he refers to as a 
simple ordering of nature and not an intelligent design.33 In this state, adaptation of an 
organism is not a choice of the organism or a selection made by nature. Words 
pertaining to agency simply reflect how things appear from our human points of view 
(which no doubt had been selected at some point): 
While it can never be stressed enough that natural selection operates with no 
foresight and no purpose, we should also not lose sight of the fact that the process 
of natural selection has proved itself to be exquisitely sensitive to rationales, 
making myriads of discriminating ‘choices’ and ‘recognizing’ and ‘appreciating’ 
many subtle relationships. To put it even more provocatively, when natural 
selection selects, it can ‘choose’ a particular design for one reason rather than 
another, without ever consciously—or unconsciously!—‘representing’ either the 
choice or the reasons. Hearts were ‘chosen’ for their excellence as blood-
circulating pumps, not for the captivating rhythm of their beating, though that 
might have been the reason some other thing was ‘chosen’ by natural selection.34 
What interests me in this passage is precisely how a so-called substance of agency is 
reduced to the state of affairs of survival. In other words, the relation between the 
occurrences of adaptation and survival are so originally linked that everything we can 
perceive from a human point of view is essentially the functioning of this state of affairs 
(i.e. survival). As Michela Massimi explains more broadly in relation to the scientific 
reduction of substance to function,  
entities no longer constitute the self-evident starting point, but the final point of 
scientific inquiry. The starting point is instead the concept of ‘function’ as it 
emerges in mathematical physics. The world is a world of functional relations 
encoded by laws of nature, through which we only have epistemic access to 
scientific entities.35 
33 Daniel Dennett, ‘Atheism and Evolution,’ in Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University, 2006, pp. 140–41. 
34 Dennett, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2013, pp. 
172–73. 
35 Michela Massimi, ‘Structural Realism: A Neo-Kantian Perspective,’ Peter Bokulich and Alisa Bokulich 
(eds.), Structural Realism, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, p. 5. 
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Yet the predominance of function is not only involved in the natural sciences, but as 
well those disciplines purporting to be scientific in their investigations and conclusions. 
For economics, understanding the state of affairs is limited to the domain of 
human behavior, which has been for the most part defined since the 1870s in the 
language of preference for utility maximization. And just as the evolutionary biologist 
might want to define nature according to survival, so the neo-classical economist might 
want to speak of nature as the competitive market. Exercising preferences in this 
market is a rational activity of choosing utility in view of the alternatives rejected and 
perhaps ranking the options from most preferred/utile to least. In this respect, the 
exercise of preference assumes the role that survival does for Dawkins and Dennett. 
Preference is that towards which economic activity is geared, that is, subsumed. 
Similarly, where a theory of evolution will speak of the conditions of the environment 
selecting for change, a theory of preference will speak of the limiting conditions of the 
competitive market which enable and restrict choice. Taken in this way, the 
application of economic theory predicated on preference can be applied to any field 
involving human choice. If you thought marriage was primarily motivated by love, 
think again. Becker infamously argues that preference cannot only explain marriage 
but does so successfully across cultural variation. His central thesis: 
Two simple principles form the heart of the analysis. The first is that, since 
marriage is practically always voluntary, either by the persons marrying or their 
parents, the theory of preferences can be readily applied, and persons marrying 
(or their parents) can be assumed to expect to raise their utility level above what 
it would be were they to remain single. The second is that, since many men and 
women compete as they seek mates, a market in marriages can be presumed to 
exist. Each person tries to find the best mate, subject to the restrictions imposed 
by market conditions.36 
Substance on this economic account is essentially the fulfilment of the function of 
utility. We might be able to explain different ways of accounting for various actions we 
undertake, but the measurements arising from the analysis of preference provide a 
least common denominator which therefore seems to be what really matters. 
But if Dawkins, Dennett, and Becker provide us with genuine cases of the 
reduction of substance into function, is there something inherently problematic about 
this reduction? Or, am I confusing a dislike for the conclusions of their theories with 
the reduction itself? It is true that I find their respective conclusions distasteful. 
However, notwithstanding this critical bias, I think germane to the reduction is how it 
36 Gary Becker, ‘A Theory of Marriage,’ in Theodore W. Schultz (ed.), Economics of the Family: Marriage, 
Children, and Human Capital, Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974, p. 300. 
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encourages a misrelation to nature, despite any specific conclusion. Why this more 
basic claim? Because the loss of the distinction between substance and function 
involves a methodological enclosure which not only discounts other theories or values, 
but discounts expressly those meanings we encounter outside any particular 
methodology by virtue of merely existing within nature. To reiterate an introductory 
point, if this type of understanding is marginalized or dismissed, scientific models 
subsequently make prescriptions for our existence on the authority of the practitioners 
within a science. This tension, which Till Düppe describes as deriving from the quest 
for authority, is one that science, economics in particular, successfully hid ‘in a garb of 
formal expressions.’37 Hans-Georg Gadamer refers to this as ‘the unassailable and 
anonymous authority’ of science.38 
THROWNNESS AND PHUSIS 
I employ the concepts of thrownness [Geworfenheit] and phusis heuristically and not 
within a claim to presenting a specific thesis on the substance of Heidegger’s thought. 
So what do I mean by heuristically? Simply that the two concepts enable us to view 
our relation to nature in a radically different way than the scientific worldview 
presented above. Given the dominance of scientific representation, they are helpful in 
liberating us into new ways of thinking. The concept of thrownness frees us from the 
illusion that we are the masters of nature by undermining any secure foundation upon 
which we might claim a position of certainty and authority. The concept of phusis frees 
us into a relation with nature where we are beholden to it by virtue of its original 
power, so to speak. 
Thrownness describes a so-called fact of our existence by which we find ourselves 
without having made a decision to exist in the first place. The thrown condition of our 
being can therefore be taken in biological and social senses. We have no choice when 
being born (biological) into a particular family and heritage (social). While birth is itself 
an event, our thrownness is not. This is because one can never outgrow or overcome 
the original lack of choice as to whether or not one should be. Heidegger thus refers to 
thrownness as an essential condition, or facticity of our being.39 More profoundly, this 
condition reveals a certain type of fragility of human existence: It is bound by a given 
historical structure of relations and meanings which enable and inhibit our 
37 Till Düppe, The Making of the Economy: A Phenomenology of Economic Science, Lanham, Lexington Books, 
2011, p. 58. 
38 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,’ in David E. Linge (ed.), 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge, Berkeley, University of California, 1976, p. 3. 
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 127/135. 
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understanding. This double relation makes problematic any claims to certain 
knowledge since by virtue of its claim to certainty it assumes it has transcended the 
original existential condition of being thrown. This is tantamount, on Heidegger’s 
view, to saying that one is no longer existing; one in fact has assumed a God’s eye 
view. Or more precisely, it is to say that one is living in a representational world in 
which one assumes a non-embodied, non-historical existence. The scientific emphasis 
on objectivity presupposes this type of representation. And while Heidegger is not 
saying that such forms of observation are false, their scope is not universally applicable 
or valid. They will be accurate within their respective field of science that has built its 
investigation on the observance of the behavior of its objects under specific conditions. 
The ‘certainty of representing’40 in science is internal to its respective field. If we 
assume that science is valid universally, then the kind of existential understanding 
made possible by our thrownness is both diminished and ignored. Heidegger therefore 
remarks that what appears to us in everyday experience (i.e. as a phenomenological 
intuition) ‘is not a genuine ground of experience for natural science.’41 But so far, this 
only means that we have two competing forms of language and engagement. The 
strong proponent of science can still proclaim the superiority of its kind of knowledge. 
Let us then bring out the contrast and show the priority (as opposed to superiority) 
of the existential form. It is precisely the condition of being thrown that allows us to 
have a range of possibilities for existence, even to be scientific. A desire for the kind of 
certainty for which science strives is, after all, not possible without a concern for the 
apparent flux of things into which one has been thrown. The limitation of being 
thrown is therefore a fundamental limit that is essentially creative. Sartre, of course, is 
famous for emphasizing this aspect when arguing that the very arbitrariness of our 
being thrown means we are not obliged to adhere to or respect the given structure of 
pre-existing historical relations to conventions and values. Thrownness only means we 
are radically free such that our action is what creates and defines us.42 Heidegger 
himself remarks, by virtue of being thrown into existence, one 
 
40 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt, 
New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 127. 
41 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology: Winter Semester 1919/20, trans. Scott M. Campbell, London, 
Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 41. 
42 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 17–18, 22–5. 
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has already got [oneself] into definite possibilities. As potentiality for being which 
[one] is, [one] has let some go by; [one] constantly adopts the possibilities of its 
being, grasps them, and goes astray.43 
So being thrown is not only to be thrown into a predetermined context but equally to 
be thrown into possibilities for one’s own existence. But is there the kind of radicality 
of freedom in this condition that Sartre proposes? 
Not on Heidegger’s account. For Sartre, thrownness marks a break from any 
reliance or tie since the very act of being thrown means we have been delivered over to 
a situation of abandonment. Whatever has thrown us into existence has claimed no 
responsibility; we are left alone. In contrast, for Heidegger being lost and losing oneself 
has inauthentic and authentic modes. What Sartre describes in terms of freedom for 
oneself is arguably the inauthentic kind of action that Heidegger sees as being 
‘ensnared within [its] own striving.’44 The ensnaring consists in relating the freedom to 
be to a specific object (as in an objective) such that one becomes oblivious of the 
relation to the object (e.g. I want lots of wealth). Heidegger points out that while it may 
seem that one might be in possession of this object, in fact one is held captive by it, 
that is, by the representation we have of it; a representation made possible only in the 
first place by a sense of radical freedom allowing one to believe one can create one’s 
self. The wealthy man, as we often know, tends to be consumed by his identity of being 
rich, of seeing himself as rich and therefore striving evermore to be so. I will only add 
here that it is not clear if Sartre’s account of bad faith can prevent this kind of 
enthrallment. Given the sincerity of one’s determination to be free through a project 
for existence, which is predicated on a negation of pre-existing values, one wonders 
how a critical force that might cause one to revise one’s project can be heard sincerely. 
It would seem that Sartre’s radically free actor would be sceptical, if not hostile, to 
such interventions. 
Opposed to a notion of radical freedom, Heidegger sees an authentic relation to 
the object of one’s projects as involving an awareness of one’s relation to being. So, in 
effect, thrownness and abandonment describe conditions of our existence according to 
which we can at once posit a possibility for being and recall how this possibility is 
predicated on a relationship to being itself. It cannot realize the former without paying 
heed to the latter. Thus, exercising choice, decision, or the execution of a project is 
43 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 135/144. In brackets, I have replaced references to Dasein (being-there) 
with the indefinite third person ‘one.’ 
44 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, trans. Ted Sadler, New York, 
Continuum, 2002, p. 154. The brackets replace the word ‘his’ for grammatical consistency. 
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authentic ‘only if we understand being.’45 This rejection of Sartre is famously expressed 
in 1946-47 when Heidegger responds in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ to Jean Beaufret. 
Where reality means only a human reality for Sartre, Heidegger refers to the pre-
eminence of being: ‘But where does le plan [a human project] come from and what is 
it? L’Être [being] et le plan are the same.’46 That is to say, to speak of projects, one must 
heed being. But what, then, does this mean? 
We can grasp this dependence on being in more concrete terms when seeing how, 
in his later thought, Heidegger refers to a bond to nature. It seems with this conceptual 
shift, the possibility to be through our actions and choices requires in some sense 
recognizing the primacy of nature. We cannot simply use nature as a resource for our 
own development. Rather, nature is the source that makes this development possible. 
Heidegger refers to this in terms of how human action is itself derivative of and 
therefore beholden to the original activity of nature as an ‘emerging and rising in itself 
and in all things.’47 To emphasize this meaning, Heidegger returns to the ancient 
Greek term phusis. 
PHUSIS AND OUR EXISTENTIAL BOND 
The translation of the Greek notion of phusis by the English term ‘nature’ is not 
without significant problems. Much of the difficulty, as Bruce Foltz explains, lies in our 
de facto representation of nature as a background and resource.48 As a background it is 
unsubstantial in constituting what it means for us to dwell. As resource, its only 
significant feature is its provision for our biological metabolism or our entertainment. 
Foltz also notes the various dimensions of meaning residing in the Greek term and 
Heidegger’s attempt to elucidate their ontological implications. In this section, I want 
to focus solely on what Foltz, when interpreting Heidegger, refers to as nature as 
‘intensified self-emergence’49 and how as self-emergent it follows that human existence 
is derivative of nature in such a way that it is called to heed it as source. The qualifier 
of ‘intensified’ has primarily to do with the intensification of nature as it emerges in 
and as human existence. In short, the processes of nature are augmented in human 
existence, and this occurs primarily through the thought we give to creative activities. 
45 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, p. 155. 
46 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism,’ in David Farrell Krell (ed.), Basic Writings, New York, 
HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 237–38. 
47 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New 
York, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 42. 
48 Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth, pp. 12–14, 32. 
49 Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth, p. 130. 
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Nature is the original creative source, and humans have a unique, even if derivative, 
creativity which re-orders or re-creates what is naturally given. The ways in which we 
draw upon nature, through excavation and landscaping for example, are instances of 
this augmentation in terms of refiguring nature by building. 
In contrast to nature as resource, Heidegger comments that the Greek notion of 
phusis names a source from which we cannot separate ourselves existentially. He writes, 
We shall now translate phusis more clearly and closer to the originally intended 
sense not so much by growth, but by the ‘self-forming prevailing of beings as a 
whole.50  
As self-forming, nature is the original source of whatever emerges in nature (i.e. 
beings). Distinct to the modern understanding, this dependency is not simply 
biological. Put more strongly, there is a bond to one’s origin. There are two meanings 
I want to highlight in my use of bond. It denotes, first, a broad ethical responsibility to 
the origin, and second, our inability to separate ourselves existentially from this origin. 
The second sense does not mean we cannot achieve any type of separation since 
through our forgetting or ignoring nature as origin, we can theoretically distance 
ourselves from it. For instance, in a mechanistic understanding of natural processes we 
are merely disengaged onlookers who see ourselves as manipulators of a process from 
which we are separate. Or practically, we can ignore a causal connection between 
certain habits and their detrimental effects on non-human species. It is therefore 
important to see two drives in Heidegger’s analysis. On the one hand, we can easily 
‘fall away’ from understanding our bond to nature. On the other hand, any 
misrelation to nature can be remedied by understanding the first sense of the bond as 
ethical. So what, then, is involved in this understanding? 
In Heidegger’s parlance, ethics involves not a code of conduct but an ethos, or an 
orientation towards reality that is fitting or appropriate. We are not only natural 
beings, and therefore a part of nature; but more importantly, we partake in nature by 
bringing things into the fullness of life such that from this fullness emerges a new 
manner of relating to things. One is not just alive, biologically, but living in a way that 
one’s own existence and one’s world become discreet concerns integral to how we 
think we might live. One way in which Heidegger attempts to emphasize this: 
Phusis means this whole prevailing that prevails through man himself, a prevailing 
that he does not have power over, but which precisely prevails through and 
around him.51 
50 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, 
Bloomington, Indiana University, 1995, p. 25. I have transliterated the ancient Greek for the sake of 
simplicity. 
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In this passage, the use of prevail achieves three meanings. First, it describes nature as 
original and prior to human being (i.e. ‘this whole prevailing’). Second, it notes how 
human beings have a special relation to nature such that as origin it in some way 
‘prevails through’ us. Third, despite this special relation, we cannot control or master 
nature since we do not have ‘power over’ it (recall that our creativity is derivative of 
nature’s creativity). Taken together, the ethical sense of the bond to nature is one in 
which we have a unique relation that creatively participates in its ongoing processes 
yet at the same time should hold in view how our creative acts are responsible to 
nature. 
Indeed, non-human organisms are also creative in the sense that they may build 
and procreate. Yet the specifically human magnitude of creativity which makes it 
categorically distinct is evident in how our creative acts have long-term and often 
detrimental implications for all of nature. Foltz explains this difference in part by the 
unique role of human language (logos). Agreeing with Heidegger, Foltz appeals to the 
way our language lets reality and nature lie before us—one does not just encounter a 
tree but, for example, something that can move one to tears of joy, as William Blake 
famously declared. The prevailing of nature, in this sense, intensifies through our 
speaking of and about nature; and furthermore, this reflexive capacity means we are in 
a position not only to think about nature but the significance of our bond to it. For 
Foltz, recognition of this bond means we are called to participate in nature in order ‘to 
preserve . . . and to protect.’52 While this may sound overly general, he draws out with 
some force that creative practices appropriate to nature would not preserve resources 
according to quantity, but rather use (and be with) them in such a way that the 
practices not only retain but keep safe how those entities naturally are.53 Perhaps this 
might sound like ‘old hat’ given an increase in awareness of environmental concerns 
and the lack of effect such concerns have had. While this may be the case (though I do 
not think it is), it does not negate the importance of understanding how human 
creativity is responsible to nature. And it may be that this creativity is being called 
upon in new ways that past environmental actions and ideas never anticipated.54 In 
other words, the apparent ineffectiveness of creative acts diminishes neither our 
responsibility nor their potential contribution. But perhaps most importantly, and 
51 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 26. 
52 Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth, p. 134. 
53 Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth, p. 161. 
54 See, for example, Brian Treanor, ‘Turn Around and Step Forward: Environmentalism, Activism, and 
the Social Imagination,’ in Todd Mei and David Lewin (eds.), From Ricoeur to Action: The Socio-Political 
Significance of Ricoeur’s Thinking, London, Continuum, 2012, pp. 155–74. 
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keeping with the theme of this essay, Foltz highlights a philosophical way of 
understanding nature and the need to care for it that does not require scientific 
confirmation, which tends to impede a recognition of this care by focusing on 
conclusive evidence with respect to human-induced climate change. We do not require 
science to confirm an ethical relation to nature. 
Thus, it is worthwhile reiterating that the recognition of this bond is not something 
for which one must be trained methodologically. And while it may not be easy to do 
by virtue of involving an attentive form of reflection, it is not the unique activity of a 
specialized group of practitioners. Heidegger thus comments that ‘however enigmatic 
and obscure,’ nature is that which we understand.55 But if we grant this bond to the 
source, a difficult question arises. Beyond environmental concerns, what kinds of 
appropriate relations does this bond specify? Indeed, the kinds of practices emerging 
from this bond are debatable. While Heidegger is often associated with a nostalgic, 
anti-technological perspective (wrongly, in my view), his conception of phusis has also 
been used to rethink productively our relation to place, landscape, and even 
economics.56 In the space remaining, instead of arguing for a specific practice that 
adheres to this bond, I want to provide a negative analysis showing how a current 
practice has a distorted relation to nature. 
NATURE AS THE SOURCE OF CONTINGENCY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 
Elsewhere I have gone into more detail about what I see to be the problematic 
subtleties of liability insurance.57 In this section, I only want to note the way in which it 
relies on a form of scientific representation that affects our existential understanding of 
contingency. Although I make no claim to actuarial science representing nature as 
resource, I nonetheless argue that it misconstrues nature as the source of contingency 
when thinking it can resolve accidents through its science. Furthermore, this science 
allows the function of insurance settlement (or indemnification) to act as the substance of 
what is really at stake in loss, injury, and accident. This conflation, as I will argue, has 
detrimental effects in our ability to cope existentially with the contingent nature of 
existence itself. That is to say, while nature is itself the source of life, it is also the 
55 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 26. 
56 Jeff Malpas, Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography, Cambridge, Cambridge University; Malpas 
(ed.), The Place of Landscape: Concepts, Contexts, Studies, Cambridge, MA: MIT; Todd Mei, The Given Economy: 
An Essay in the Hermeneutics and Phenomenology of Dwelling (forthcoming). 
57 Todd Mei, ‘Insurance in Between: A Critique of Liability Insurance and Its Principles,’ Literature and 
Theology, vol. 21, no. 1, 2007, pp. 82–98. 
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source of contingency which threatens this life. A failure to grasp this means 
fundamentally that we have an incapacity to live in harmony with contingency. 
It is well known, of course, that existentialism takes as its sounding board the 
finiteness of existence and its unpredictability and even inherent meaninglessness. The 
confrontation with questions of finitude serve a positive role of allowing us to rethink 
our existence in radically new ways, ways that break from what are often held to be 
illusory ideals with catastrophic results, evinced particularly by the two World Wars. 
Furthermore, this encounter with the finite is not unique in the sense that only a 
special type of person is open to it. Rather, we are all open to it because we are all 
finite; it may just be that we tend or choose to ignore the significance of these 
encounters. 
Having said this, one way in which we address the contingent nature of things is to 
ensure that when someone suffers a loss, there is some form of compensation. In 
general insurance parlance, this means restoring the victim to his or her wholeness 
prior to the loss. Liability insurance deals with property damage and injury (bodily and 
mental), and herein I am concerned only with the latter. For, it is in injury caused to 
others that the institution of insurance, and thus society generally, believes in the 
legitimacy of correcting for injury by means of financial compensation. There are 
indeed significant problems with this corrective procedure which encourage a litigious 
mindset and, in turn, the escalation of monetary settlements, insurance premiums, and 
cost for medical treatments. More basic than these, however, is the root existential 
problem involving how contingency itself is represented scientifically through actuarial 
practices. 
Actuarial science employs a form of statistical modeling enabling insurance 
companies to consider their exposure to risks in order to calculate premiums providing 
coverage for such risks. For example, assessment of liability in auto insurance will 
consider, among other things, the age, gender, and credit rating of a driver. So while 
an insurance company provides a qualified guarantee to compensate individuals who 
have suffered a loss, the subsequent effect occurs as a sort of transvaluation via the 
social imagination—namely, risk and loss themselves have financial value. Arguably, 
this model of transvaluation is not problematic with respect to loss of property which 
can be replaced by an equivalent of like, kind, and quality. With injury, however, there 
is no good reason to assume that financial payment can restore an injured individual 
to a state of wholeness. Loss of wages and medical expenses help to make such 
calculations, and we all know the common practice of plaintiff attorneys asking for 
three times the amount of these damages to address issues of pain and suffering. But it 
does not take a scientist of any kind to see the discordance between the different forms 
 TODD MEI 157 
of value—financial and existential. This is because injury, and in radical cases such as 
loss of limbs, affects our self-identity.58 
Given this mismatch, what then would be the consequence when this 
transvaluation is widespread? Not only will more people be seeking compensation in 
terms of financial value, but we will tend to see the contingent nature of reality as that 
which can be addressed adequately by this valuation. More severely, the instance 
might even arise when we are no longer capable of providing a form of compensation 
except financially. In other words, the existential question is neither no longer 
prominent in our reflective relation to nature nor seen to have much relevance given 
financial ways of addressing loss. One need only recall that a loss adjuster in insurance 
is there to make a financial settlement and not address the psychological, emotional, 
and philosophical problems resulting from the proximate cause of loss. Yet it may be 
the case that existentialist thoughts and concerns need not remain the domain of the 
philosophically-minded person. What if the science foundational to insurance was 
complemented by this existential approach? What if the insurance industry found a 
way to genuinely ask and engage with these questions not just in their literature but in 
their procedures of adjusting losses? We might find that financial value recedes to the 
background and what emerges are the efforts to restore victims according to a 
discussion addressing those things that really, existentially matter to a self no longer 
whole. The problem of the loss of wholeness would then be a human matter of 
restoring the victim through attention, care, and conversation. It seems in this sense 
insurance adjusting practices fall quite short since rarely do these practices call for or 
invite a basic action attempting to resolve incidents that are genuinely accidental—
namely, the apology. 
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